The purpose of the law was "[tlo protect the citizens of the District from loss of property, death, and injury, by controlling the availability of firearms in the c~m m u n i t y . "~ Toward this end, the Firearms Control Regulations Act prohibited the purchase, sale, transfer, and, with one exception, possession ofhandguns by D.C. residents other than law enforcement officers or members ofthe military. The exception with respect to possession involved owners of handguns and longguns-rifles andshotguns-who had registered their fire- (Washington, DC, 24 Sept. 1976). arms under the District's 1968 registration law.2 To be in compliance with the Firearms Control Regulations Act, handgun and longgun owners were required to re-register their firearms within 60 days following the effective date of the act. After that date, handguns were "unregisterable," but longguns could be registered if they were newly acquired, in person, from a licensed dealer in the D i~t r i c t .~
The Firearms Control Regulations Act also required all firearm reregistrants and future purchasers of rifles and shotguns to file with the Metropolitan Police Department an "Application for Firearms Registration Certificate" and be screened to determine eligibility to possess. accidents,18 and the second was to more effectively "monitor the traffic in firearms." The objectives were reflective of the failures of the 1968 registration law, most visible in a record number of homicides in 1974 and in the ease with which juveniles were obtaining access to handguns."
The first objective was addressed in the Firearms Control Regulations Act by possession requirements that constrained the "easy availability" and enhanced the accountabilitv of firearm owners, and by the ban on the future possession of the most frequently used firearm in crime, the handgun. Council members in the legislative debate were mindful of the fact that the proposed possession requirements generally would have more of an impact on law-abiding firearm owners than criminal users because criminal users likelv would not attempt to re-register.18 Nevertheless, they considered the possession requirements desirable because of their potential for reducing the number of easily accessible handguns that could be used in argumentative situations spontaneously by law-abiding citizens and with relatively greater lethal effect than other potential weapons. The requirement that residents maintain firearms in residences in an immediately inoperable condition, which was the subject of lengthy legisl a t' ive 16. Fatal firearm accidents in the District of Columbia, in relation to all fatal home and occ~~pational accidents, are relatively infrequent. Of931 fatal home and occupational accidents during the period 1974-79, only 0.5 percent, or five, were firearm related. See Government of the District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources, Office of the Chief' Medical Examiner, Annual R e )~o r t (Washington, DC, 1974-79 debate,lS reinforces this consideration and the council's notion that a handgun or other firearm was not a desirable instrument for home protection.
The second objective of enhanced control over firearm traffic was addressed in the proposed Firearms Control Regulations Act by the more stringent possession requirements, particularly the owner's responsibility to report and the prohibition on his transferring of a firearm. In addition to increased accountabilitv standards for owners, the ~i r e a r m i Control Regulations Act, in its ban on future handgun sales, purchases, and transfers, permitted the freezing of the stock of permissible, registered handguns in the District. It also led toward the eventual diminution of that stock with the death of or moving from the District by D.C. residents owning registered handguns, and with the deterioration of or voluntary, "no questions asked" turn-in of registered or unregistered handguns to the Metropolitan Police Department. This evaluation includes a brief description of the legislative history and provisions of the Firearms Control Regulations Act, an analysis of previous research pertaining to the effectiveness of firearm controls; a tabular presentation of annual data for 1974-79 on total rates of homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault for Washington, D.C., and eight control groups-United States, the South, all cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 in population, Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, San Antonio, and San Diego-a tabular presentation of annual data for 1974-79 on firearm-related rates of homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault for Washington, D.C., and three control groups-United States, the South, and all cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 in population-a tabular presentation of annual data for 1974-79 on suicide and accident rates for Washington, D.C., and the United States; and an analysis of annual percentage changes in incidence rates for Washington, D.C., and control jurisdictions approximately three years before-1974-76-and three years after-1977-79-the effective date of the Firearms Control Regulations Act.
The Conference of Mayors' analysis and findings received prominent coverage in the metropolitan sections of the Washington Postz2 and Wu.vhington S t c l r . 2 T h e Post and Stur also reported in their coverage that the National Rifle Association and Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., questioned the accuracy of the Conference of Mayors' findings. The National Rifle Association contended that crime was "cyclical" and would have declined in the absence of the Firearms Control Regulations Act and that criminals would ignore the requirements of the Act and acquire handguns if they so chose.24 The Metropolitan Police Department echoed the National Rifle Association's contention pertaining to the cyclical nature of crime and reportedly said through its spokesman that "gun-related crimes cannot clearly be attributed to gun registration" because the Conference of Mayors' study did not examine the effect of "new law enforcement tactics and programs."25 Further, the Metropolitan Police Department spokesman noted the ease with which handguns could be obtained in neighboring jurisdictions. In particular, he reportedly said that "less than 1 percent of all firearms confiscated each year by police are registered here or elsewhere, 'so somehow or other, the illegal guns are still getting in here.' "2"
In addition, in October 1980, Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio reported on the findings of a Congressional Research Service evaluation of the Conference of Mayors' study that he had requested. The Congressional Research Sewice evaluation concluded that the study was ' flawed by an inappropriate model' " and " '[allthough the Firearms Control Act may have affected the crime rate in the District of Columbia, it is our judgment, based on the information at hand, 24. The latter contention was articulated by citizens nearly four years earlier as they stood fbr up to three hours in line waiting to reregister their handguns. See Jacqueline Bolder, "Gun Registry Goes Slowly in District," Washington Star, 16 Nov. 1976 
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS' ANALYSIS
Crucial factors in the sustainability of the U.S. Conference of Mayors' conclusion pertain to the appropriateness of assumptions and research method. The Conference of Mayors' study acknowledges that "confounding influences of exogenous socio-economic factors may impact the level of crime independently of any l e g i~l a t i o n "~~ and criticizes the methods of previous studies because they have not accounted for "differential enforcement policies, inaccuracy of reporting data, numbers of transient residents, interstate traffic in firearms and harshness of penalties among states and cities."29 The U.S. Conference of Mayors' study also does not consider these "accountability" factors. Rather, the U.S. Conference of Mayors' study assumes "that violence in Washington, D.C. is subject to the same exogenous forces as is crime in other communities and regions of the country."30
For two reasons in particular, the U.S. Washington, D.C.; Boston, Massachusetts; and Chicago, lllinois (Washington, DC, 1978) .
Operation CUE, 82 percent of firearms successfully traced had been purchased interstate and that in a three-month period-February through April 1977-during Operation CUE, 79 percent had been so purchased.33 The magnitude of those numbers, which are substantially higher than the comparable figures for the other Operation CUE cities of Boston and Chicago, and the ease with which handguns can be purchased in nearby Virginia," albeit in violation of federal law, would dictate that interstate traffic in firearms be an important factor in an analysis of firearm control effectiveness in the District.
With regard to research'method, She U.S. Conference of Mayors' study is deficient in its choice and use of control jurisdictions. The appropriate control for comparison of changes in D.C. crime rates are other urban jurisdiction^.^^ The U.S. Conference of Mayors' study uses five such jurisdictions, but offers no choice criterion for the cities studied. Further, in its use of the control jurisdictions, it only employs the control cities for analysis of total crime rate changes, not firearmrelated crime rate changes. As the following analysis of Washington, D.C., and other urban jurisdiction firearm-related crime rates shows, Washington, D.C. did not have "the greatest decrease in crime rates in all three ~a t e g o r i e s . "~~ Table 1 provides data on firearm-related robbery and aggravated assault for urban jurisdictions "comparable" to Washington, D.C., and for suburban jurisdictions proximate to Washington, D.C. The choice of urban jurisdictions shown was suggested by an analysis of the District of Columbia's Office of Budget and Management. It found that nine cities, comparable in size to Washington, D.C., all experiencing population declines between 1960 and 1975, were "more similar in terms of density, percent of the population on welfare, percent of housing built before 1940, the rate of increase in the daytime population, and the proportion of the total metropolitan population residing in the central city" than comparably sized cities with population increase^.^' Because of their similarity to Washington, D.C., the set of urban jurisdictions shown is appropriate for comparison of changes in relative frequency of firearm use in robbery and aggravated assadlt.
Further evidence
Looking at urban jurisdictions, Boston, Milwaukee, and Seattle experienced greater percentage declines in the frequency of firearm use in robbery than did Washington, D.C., and Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle experienced greater percentage declines in the frequency of firearm use in aggravated assault. This contradicts the findings of the 
